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Commercial Law-EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL AND THE U.C.C. STATUTE OF
FRAUDS-Sacred Heart Farmers Cooperative Elevator v. Johnson, 305
Minn. 324, 232 N.W. 2d 921 (1975); Del Hayes & Sons, Inc. v. Mitchell,
304 Minn. 275, 230 N.W.2d 588 (1975).
In two recent cases, Del Hayes & Sons, Inc. v. Mitchell' and Sacred
Heart Farmers Cooperative Elevator v. Johnson,2 the Minnesota Su-
preme Court held that in the absence of misrepresentation or conceal-
ment of material facts, equitable estoppel is not available to take an oral
contract for the sale of grain out of the Uniform Commercial Code's
(hereinafter U.C.C.) Statute of Frauds.
3
In Del Hayes, the plaintiff orally agreed to sell and the defendants to
purchase a quantity of soybeans for $3.50 per bushel. After approxi-
mately 4,020 bushels had been delivered, the parties disagreed as to
whether or not the oral agreement had been fully performed.' Payment
for the soybeans which had been delivered had not been made, causing
plaintiff to file suit seeking recovery of the agreed price.5 Defendants
counterclaimed for damages arising from plaintiff's alleged failure to
deliver the agreed upon quantity of soybeans. The Statute of Frauds was
asserted by the plaintiff in reply to defendants' counterclaim., Finding
the counterclaim to be within the Statute of Frauds despite defendants'
offer to prove that they had contracted to resell 5,000 bushels in reliance
on the oral contract, the trial court granted summary judgment. The
trial court rejected defendants' argument that the alleged conduct and
representations of the plaintiff estopped him from asserting the Statute
of Frauds, holding that, even if proved, the allegations were not suffi-
cient to constitute an estoppel. The defendants appealed, one issue7
1. 304 Minn. 275, 230 N.W.2d 588 (1975).
2. 305 Minn. 324, 232 N.W.2d 921 (1975).
3. MINN. STAT. § 336.2-201 (1976). This section corresponds to U.C.C. § 2-201 (1972
version).
4. The plaintiff claimed that the contract was for 4,000 bushels, while the defendants
claimed that the contract was for a "bin of beans" which they claimed would amount to
approximately 5,000 to 5,500 bushels. 304 Minn. at 281, 230 N.W.2d at 592.
5. The parties stipulated that the agreed price for the grain actually delivered was
$13,151.73. Id. at 277, 230 N.W.2d at 590.
6. Plaintiff was allowed to amend its reply to defendants' counterclaim to include the
defense of the Statute of Frauds after the trial court raised the issue during the pretrial
conference. Id.
7. Defendants' appeal raised three other issues. The first issue was whether the trial
court had exceeded its authority in granting what amounted to a summary judgment sua
sponte based on the record. The supreme court held that, while none of the procedural
rules expressly give the trial court authority to enter a summary judgment on its own
motion, the power is inherent and it was properly exercised by the trial court. In so
holding, the court cited Niazi v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 265 Minn. 222, 121 N.W.2d
349 (1963). Another issue raised was whether a general issue of material fact was presented
with respect to the question of whether a "bin of beans" constituted a commercial unit
within the meaning of MINN. STAT. § 336.2-105(6) (1976), the defendant having argued
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being whether a genuine issue of a material fact existed concerning
whether the plaintiff was estopped from asserting the Statute of Frauds.
The Minnesota Supreme Court stated that, while the U.C.C.'s Stat-
ute of Frauds' does not expressly indicate that estoppel can take a
contract out of the Statute of Frauds, the general savings provision of
the U.C.C. provides that common law principles, including estoppel,
apply unless expressly displaced by provisions of the U.C.C.1 The court
distinguished equitable estoppel' from promissory estoppel," holding
that promissory estoppel was inapplicable because an oral contract ex-
isted.' 2 The court then considered equitable estoppel, referring to the
elements of equitable estoppel as stated by Pomeroy,' 3 which make it
that the contract was for a "bin of beans," that less than a "bin of beans" had been
delivered, that acceptance of any part of a bin under MINN. STAT. § 336.2-606(2) (1976)
constituted acceptance of the entire bin, and that thus the Statute of Frauds was not
applicable. The supreme court did not reach the issue, holding instead that under MINN.
STAT. § 336.2-201(3)(c) (1976) the goods must "have been received and accepted" before
the Statute of Frauds can be avoided, relying on Johnston Jewels, Ltd. v. Leonard, 156
Conn. 75, 239 A.2d 500 (1968). The issue of whether the trial court erred in entering
judgment against the defendant Mitchell individually was also raised on appeal. The
court held that Mitchell's failure to make a proper record concerning this issue precluded
him from raising it on appeal.
8. MINN. STAT. § 336.2-201(1) (1976) provides:
Except as otherwise provided in this section a contract for the sale of goods for
the price of $500 or more is not enforceable by way of action or defense unless
there is some writing sufficient to indicate that a contract for sale has been made
between the parties and signed by the party against whom enforcement is sought
or by his authorized agent or broker.
9. MINN. STAT. § 336.1-103 (1976) provides: "Unless displaced by the particular provi-
sions of this chapter, the principles of law and equity, including the law merchant and
the law relative to capacity to contract, principal and agent, estoppel, fraud, misrepresen-
tation, duress, coercion, mistake, bankruptcy, or other validating or invalidating cause
shall supplement its provisions."
10. Equitable estoppel sometimes is referred to as estoppel in pais. E.g., Roberts v.
Friedell, 218 Minn. 88, 96, 15 N.W.2d 496, 500 (1944).
11. Promissory estoppel is sometimes referred to as quasi-contract. E.g., Del Hayes &
Sons v. Mitchell, 304 Minn. 275, 282, 230 N.W.2d 588, 593 (1975).
12. The effect of promissory estoppel is to imply a contract where a contract does not
otherwise exist. See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1932).
13. See 3 J. POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 805 (5th ed. 1941). Pome-
roy sets forth the elements of equitable estoppel as follows:
1. There must be conduct-acts, language, or silence-amounting to a repre-
sentation or a concealment of material facts. 2. These facts must be known
to the party estopped at the time of said conduct, or at least the circumstances
must be such that the knowledge of them is necessarily imputed to
him. 3. The truth concerning these facts must be unknown to the other party
claiming the benefit of the estoppel, at the time when such conduct was done,
and at the time when it was acted upon by him. 4. The conduct must be done
with the intention, or at least with the expectation, that it will be acted upon
by the other party, or under such circumstances that it is both natural and
probable that it will be so acted upon. There are several familiar species in
19771
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"akin to fraud" and require a representation or concealment of material
facts.'" Affirming the trial court, the supreme court held that the de-
fendants' offer of proof did not show a representation or concealment
of material facts and thus could not take the oral contract out of the
Statute of Frauds.
In Sacred Heart Farmers Cooperative Elevator v. Johnson,'5 the de-
fendant farmer orally agreed" to sell plaintiff grain elevator 30,000 bush-
els of corn at $1.22 per bushel.'" The defendant overheard plaintiff's
manager call a grain dealer and negotiate a resale of defendant's corn.,
Despite defendant's urging over a period of several months," plaintiff
refused to take delivery. When plaintiff finally requested delivery, de-
fendant refused, having sold the corn elsewhere a few days earlier. The
plaintiff sued and a jury found that plaintiff had relied on the oral
contract to its detriment, that defendant had knowledge of the reliance,
and that plaintiff was entitled to $6,900 in damages. The defendant
appealed, the sole issue being whether equitable estoppel could prevent
the defendant from raising the Statute of Frauds defense and thereby
render the contract unenforceable.
The Minnesota Supreme Court, considering the facts to be "legally
indistinguishable" from Del Hayes, reversed, holding that equitable es-
toppel was not available. The court stated that the defendant had made
no factual representations which he later sought to deny and that none
of his actions were so tainted with unfair dealing as to approach fraud
which it is simply impossible to ascribe any intention or even expectation to the
party estopped that his conduct will be acted upon by the one who afterwards
claims the benefit of the estoppel. 5. The conduct must be relied upon by the
other party, and, thus relying, he must be led to act upon it. 6. He must in
fact act upon it in such a manner as to change his position for the worse; in other
words, he must so act that he would suffer a loss if he were compelled to
surrender or forego or alter what he has done by reason of the first party being
permitted to repudiate his conduct and to assert rights inconsistent with it.
Id. at 191-92 (emphasis in original).
14. See, e.g., Bremer v. Commissioner of Taxation, 246 Minn. 446, 454-55, 75 N.W.2d
470, 475 (1956).
15. 305 Minn. 324, 232 N.W.2d 921 (1975).
16. During the trial, the defendant denied that any contract ever existed. However, the
jury found, based on abundant evidence, that an oral contract existed and this finding
was not appealed.
17. The corn was to be delivered within 60 days or whenever boxcars, apparently for
hauling corn, became available. See 305 Minn. at 324, 232 N.W.2d at 922.
18. In this aspect Sacred Heart differs from Del Hayes, since it is clear that the de-
fendant in Sacred Heart was aware that a resale contract had been made while it is not
clear from the facts in Del Hayes whether the plaintiff was expressly aware of the resale
contract.
19. The oral contract was entered into on January 19, 1973, and the plaintiff refused to
accept delivery through all of February, March, and April. This refusal was apparently
based on the unavailability of boxcars.
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and preclude him from invoking the Statute of Frauds.'
In Del Hayes, the Minnesota Supreme Court correctly distinguished
promissory estoppel and equitable estoppel. Promissory estoppel is used
to imply a contract where one does not otherwise exist2' and has been
considered as "a species of or substitute for consideration. ' 2 Thus, be-
cause the existence of a contract was not in issue, the court properly
refused to apply promissory estoppel. 3 Equitable estoppel, on the other
hand, was defined by the court as requiring a representation or con-
cealment of a material fact, and it may be utilized to take an otherwise
unenforceable oral contract out of the Statute of Frauds.
In stating that the U.C.C.'s Statute of Frauds does not prevent the
application of the doctrine of equitable estoppel, the court followed its
previous non-U.C.C. decisions concerning the Statute of Frauds in cases
involving the sale of real estate. 4 All other jurisdictions which have
considered the applicability of the doctrine of equitable estoppel to
Statute of Frauds cases, except one,2 5 have reached the same conclu-
sion."
In adopting Pomeroy's requirements for equitable estoppel,2 7 and
thereby requiring a representation or concealment of material facts,
28
the Minnesota Supreme Court followed what could be termed the
20. The supreme court, citing Del Hayes as recognizing that there is always some degree
of reliance on an oral contract, stated that the plaintiff's reliance in making a resale was
not sufficient to require an estoppel. 305 Minn. at 327, 232 N.W.2d at 923.
21. The classic statement of promissory estoppel is contained in the RESTATEMENT OF
CONTRACTS § 90 (1932) which provides: "A promise which the promisor should reasonably
expect to induce action or forbearance of a definite and substantial character on the part
of the promisee and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice
can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise."
22. Constructors Supply Co. v. Bostrom Sheet Metal Works, Inc., 291 Minn. 113, 116,
190 N.W.2d 71, 74 (1971).
23. As was discussed in Note, Statute of Frauds-The Doctrine of Equitable Estoppel
and the Statute of Frauds, 66 MICH. L. REV. 170, 175-79 (1967), a number of jurisdictions
have failed to distinguish promissory estoppel from equitable estoppel when dealing with
the Statute of Frauds.
24. E.g., Poksyla v. Sundholm, 259 Minn. 125, 106 N.W.2d 202 (1960). The court also
followed its prior decisions that an essential element of equitable estoppel is a represen-
tation or concealment of material facts. See Bremer v. Commissioner of Taxation, 246
Minn. 446, 454, 75 N.W.2d 470, 475 (1956).
25. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has, in its own words, "consistently held that
principles of estoppel may not be invoked against operation of the Statute of Frauds." Del
Borrello v. Lauletta, 455 Pa. 350, 352, 317 A.2d 254, 255 (1974) (citing Polka v. May, 383
Pa. 80, 118 A.2d 154 (1955); Peterson v. Chandler, 362 Pa. 102, 66 A.2d 284 (1949); Mott
v. Kaldes, 288 Pa. 264, 135 A. 764 (1927)).
26. See Note, supra note 23, at 180.
27. See note 13 supra.
28. Sacred Heart Farmers Coop. Elevator v. Johnson, 305 Minn. 324, 327, 232 N.W.2d
921, 923 (1975); Del Hayes & Sons, Inc. v. Mitchell, 304 Minn. 275, 286, 230 N.W.2d 588,
595 (1975).
19771
4
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 3, Iss. 1 [1977], Art. 10
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol3/iss1/10
WILLIAM MITCHELL LA W REVIEW
historical view of equitable estoppel." This view is consistent with
that of other jurisdictions which have considered the applicability of
equitable estoppel in the context of cases involving the sale of growing
crops '5 and is probably the majority view. However, a substantial
minority of jurisdictions have eliminated the requirement that there
be a representation of material facts.3 One minority approach which
appears to have growing support requires: (1) a promise to perform, (2)
reasonable reliance on the promise, and (3) that either an
"unconscionable injury or unjust enrichment" would result from a re-
fusal to enforce the contract.3 This approach essentially allows avoid-
ance of the Statute of Frauds in all cases except those in which its
enforcement would not produce an unconscionable result.3 A somewhat
similar approach which seeks to enforce oral contracts where enforce-
ment is necessary to avoid injustice is stated in Section 217A of the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts.34 The Restatement advocates that
29. See Note, supra note 23, at 173.
30. See Cox v. Cox, 292 Ala. 106, 289 So. 2d 609 (1974) (oral contract for the sale of
cotton); Farmers Coop. Ass'n v. Cole, 239 N.W.2d 808 (N.D. 1976) (oral contract for the
sale of wheat; cited and followed Sacred Heart and Del Hayes). But see Farmers Elevator
Co. v. Lyle, - S.D. -, 238 N.W.2d 290 (1976) (oral contract for the sale of corn).
31. Note, supra note 23, at 174.
32. See Mosekian v. Davis Canning Co., 229 Cal. App. 2d 118, 40 Cal. Rptr. 157 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1964). For a good discussion of the development of the "unconscionable injury
or unjust enrichment" position in California, see Comment, Equitable Estoppel and the
Statute of Frauds in California, 53 CALIF. L. REv. 590 (1965).
33. Under this approach, recovery would not be allowed in those cases where recovery
for an expectation interest is sought, see, e.g., Bach v. Perkins, 223 F.2d 251 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 350 U.S. 918 (1955); where the plaintiff's reliance is not justified, see, e.g.,
Aubrey v. Workman, 384 S.W.2d 389 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964); or where restitution
would provide satisfactory relief, see, e.g., Kobus v. San Diego Trust & Sav. Bank, 172
Cal. App. 2d 574, 342 P.2d 468 (1959).
34. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 217A (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1973) provides:
(1) A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action
or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person and which does
induce the action or forbearance is enforceable notwithstanding the Statute of
Frauds if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise. The
remedy granted for breach is to be limited as justice requires.
(2) In determining whether injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the
promise, the following circumstances are significant:
(a) the availability and adequacy of other remedies, particularly
cancellation and restitution;
(b) the definite and substantial character of the action or forbear-
ance in relation to the remedy sought;
(c) the extent to which the action or forbearance corroborates evi-
dence of the making and terms of the promise, or the making and
terms are otherwise established by clear and convincing evidence;
(d) the reasonableness of the action or forbearance;
(e) the extent to which the action or forbearance was foreseeable by
the promisor.
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